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*  
As a result of opening and reform, China has maintained an annual average growth rate 
of 9.8 percent for nearly three decades. China’s growth is based on high savings and high 
investment. Its export promotion policy has also played a very important role in promoting 
economic growth. However, as a result of China’s growth pattern characterised by investment-
driven  and  export  promotion,  the  Chinese  economy  also  has  been  suffering  from  serious 
structural  imbalances.  Its  high  and  ever-rising  investment  rate  has  created  overheat  and 
overcapacity in tandem. Its high dependency on external market makes its economy vulnerable 
to external shocks. The global financial crisis has hit the economy seriously and exposed the 
structural weakness of the economy. The dramatic fall of external demand led to dramatic 
slowdown  of  the  economy.  The  Chinese  government  responded  to  the  slowdown  of  the 
economy swiftly and forcefully. A four trillion Renmibi stimulus package and expansionary 
monetary policy have successfully stabilised the economy. However, the stimulate policy has 
worsened structural problems. China’s structure problems include high external dependency, 
high investment rate, deterioration of environment, widening income gap between different 
social group and between rural and urban areas, insufficiency in the provision of social goods 
and so on. Due to its strong fiscal position, there should be no problem with China to achieve a 
growth rate of 8 percent. At the same time, the Chinese government should be able to tackle its 
structural problems successfully so as to ensure the sustainability of China’s economic growth.  
JEL classification:  G01, E44, E65 
Keywords:  Growth, Global Financial Crisis, Stimulus Package, Structural Adjustment  
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is aimed at assessing China’s economic performance in recent years 
and  China’s  policy  responses  to  the  global  financial  crisis.  The  first  section  depicts 
China’s economic performance since 1990s, especially after 2002. In this section, factors 
behind China’s persistent high growth are identified within the framework of traditional 
growth accounting. At same time, short-run analysis on the demand side of the economy 
is also made. The main findings of the analysis are that the Chinese economy has been 
suffered from overcapacity chronically, and in the short-run, owing to China’s growth 
pattern  characterised  by  investment-driven  and  export-driven,  the  overcapacity  was 
concealed  and  the  economy  was  overheating  due  to  strong  investment  demand  and 
external demand. The second section analyses causes of the sudden loss of the speed of 
the Chinese economy. It is pointed out that the sudden disappearance of external demand 
and cooling down of investment fever turned an overheating economy into deflation. The 
third  section  introduces  China’s  macroeconomic  policy  responses  towards  the  global 
economic crisis. While government’s policy direction is fully endorsed, some worries are  
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expressed about the worsening of the structural problems. In the fourth section, a rather 
optimistic  assessment  is  given  on  the  short-run  economic  perspective.  However,  the 
possibility discussed is that in the longer run, due to the worsening structural problems, 
the Chinese economy may loss its growth momentum of the past three decades. The final 
section presents concluding remarks.   
I.  CHINA’S GROWTH SINCE 1990 
Since the reform and opening up, China has created a truly economic miracle. Its 
average annual growth rate of GDP over the three decades since 1979 was 9.8 percent, 
though there are several ups and down in the past. In the period from 2002 to 2007, 
China’s economic growth was even more impressive, which registered an average annual 
growth rate of 10.5 percent. Before the global financial crisis struck in the last quarter of 
2008, China’s economic growth was still very strong.  
The Supply Side of the Chinese Economy 
Why and how China was able to maintain a very high GDP growth rate for three 
decades  is  a  very  important  as  well  as  interesting  question.  No  one  should  be  so 
presumptuous as to say that the answer has been found. However, there are many tentative 
answers that can be found in the literature. Following the traditional approach, as a starting 
point, we use the most widely used growth account framework proposed by Solow to 
identify the driving forces of China’s growth: 
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Where the “gy, gy, gl” are the growth rates of GDP, the capital stock, and employed labour, 
the “wk, wl” are the shares of capital income and labour income in national income, and “a” 
is the residual that measures total factor productivity growth.
1 
According to Solow’s growth accounting, given the shares of capital income 
and labour income in national income the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)  can  be  treated  as  being  determined  by  the  growth  rates  of  capital  stock, 
employed labour and total factor productivity (TFP). There are numerous literatures 
on China’s growth accounting.  
The following is a summary of some main results of investigations on contributing 
factors to the GDP growth by both Chinese and foreign economists.  
It is difficult to judge which results are more reliable. All underlining models for 
growth accounting are deficient one way or another, and statistics are hardly reliable. For 
example, most growth accounting models assume constant return to scale, which is a very 
doubtful  assumption.  How  to  use  an  appropriate  deflator  to  calculate  capital  stock  in 
constant price is very controversial in China. Based on the Table 1, we can draw tentative 
conclusions that capital accumulation is the single most important contributing factor to 
growth, the contribution of TFP is significant, and labour contribution is the least important 
among the three factors of production. These conclusions are consistent with most Chinese 
economists’ experience and intuition.   
1Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-I-Martin (1995) Economic Growth. New York, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 
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Table 1  
The Contributions of Factors of Production to the GDP Growth 
Authors  Period  Growth Rate  Capital  Labour  TFP 
Maddison (1998)  1978-1995  7.5  49  21  30 
Chow and Li (2000)  1978-1998  9.3  55  13  32 
Wu (2002)  1980-2004  9.5  52  11  37 
Hu and Khan (1997)  1979-1994  9.3  46  13  41 
Swamy (2003)  1980-1997  10.0  39  16  45 
World Bank (1997)  1978-1995  9.4  37  17  46 
Bosworth and Collins (2003)  1980-1990  9.2  23  31  46 
Bosworth and Collins(2003)  1990-2000  10.1  32  18  50 
Zhang and Shi (2003)  1978-1989     28.9 
Hu (2003)  1995-2001   57.6-86.3  4.39-2.93
2  3.9-27.8 
Xiang Ao, Fulginiti and Lilyan (2003)      38.7 
Wang and Yao (2003)  1978-1999   47.7  15.9  25.4
3 
Sun and Ren (2005)  1981-2002     34.6 
Rawski (2006)  1978-2004     29 
Cai (2006)  Since reform
 
 
28  24  48 
Kuijs (2006)   1978-1993   46  13  40 
Kuijs (2006)  1993- 
2005  
61  6  32 
Hu (2007)      50 
Source:  WuYanrui:  Can  China’s  Economic  Performance  Be  Sustained  by  Productivity  Growth?,  EAI 
Background Brief No. 265, December 2005. Wang Ling: A Research Note, 2007. 
Note: In Cai’s calculation, contribution of education (24 percent) and migration from farming to non-farming 
(21 percent) is included in TFP.  
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  TFP  contribution  can  be  further  disaggregated. 
Although it is statistically difficult to quantify, the constant reform of the economy has 
played important role in raising the TFP. As pointed out by Perkins that, “it was the jump in 
productivity that came first and lifted the rate of GDP growth and that higher rate of GDP 
growth in turn made it possible for a given rate of investment as a share of GDP to produce 
a much higher rate of growth of capital. From time to time new bursts of productivity in 
particular sectors (first agriculture, then TVEs, and then FDI) helped keep the high growth 
in both GDP and capital formation going.” [Perkins (2006), p. 26]   
The Demand Side of the Economy: Two Engines of Growth 
Until the middle of 1990s, the growth pattern or the growth strategy of the Chinese 
economy was not very clear. Though there were plentiful twists and turns, China’s growth 
pattern has more and more clearly discernable over the years since the reform and opening up 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Export promotion and attraction of FDI were two key 
elements of China’s post-reform growth strategy. On top of some inherent features of the 
Chinese economy, such as high saving rate and so on, as a result of implementing this growth 
strategy, gradually, fixed asset investment (FAI) and exports have become the two most 
important engines of China’s growth. During the period of 2002-2007 in China, the average 
annual growth rate of exports was 29 percent and the average annual growth rate of fixed 
assets  investment  was  24  percent.  In  2007,  the  combined  contribution  of  fixed  assets 
investment and net exports to GDP growth was more than 60 percent (Figure 1).  
2Contribution by human capital is 6.83-10.24 percent. 
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Fig. 1.  Growth Rates of Exports and Investment  
Sources: Statistical Year Book (various issues) Statistics Bureau of PRC.  
Since the turn of the century, the Chinese economy has become more and more 
relied on external demand, and the share of current account surplus (mainly trade surplus) 
in GDP has been on rising rapidly. In 2007 the contribution of trade surplus to GDP 
growth was almost 10 percent of GDP (Figure 2).  
Fig. 2.  Share of Current Account Surplus/GDP 
Current Account Surplus / GDP
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Source:  CEIC, UBS estimates.  
As a result of the investment-driven and export-driven growth strategy over 
the  past  two  decades,  China’s  economic  structure  has  changed  correspondingly. 
China’s investment rate has risen to more than 40 percent, significantly higher even 
than those of Japan when they were in the periods of high growth in 1957-1984 and 
1978-2005, respectively (Figure 3). China’s trade over GDP ratio is also much higher 
than all major open economies in the rest of the world. In contrast to America’s less 
than 20 percent, in 2000s, China trade over GDP ratio has been above 60 percent and 
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Fig. 3. Investment Rates, International Comparison 
 
Source: imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/pdf/012306.pdf  














































































































































Source: Wu Haiying, based on Statistical Year Book of China, (various issues).  
However,  since  2006,  as  a  result  of  the  government’s  policy  of  rebalancing, 
China’s dependency on external markets has started to fall.  
Over Capacity 
As a result of extremely high investment and other favourable conditions, China 
has been  able to  build  up  its  production  capacities. The  expansion  of  China’s  steel 
industry is a case in point. In 2004 when China’s steel production capacity was less 
than 400 million ton, because of the worry about overcapacity in the steel industry, the 
government started to clamp down on building new steel mills. In a very famous case, 
which  was  known  as  Tieben  event,  a  manager  of  a  steel  mill,  which  was  under 
construction, was arrested on charge of tax evasion, and his mill under construction 
was abandoned with great losses of investment and loans. However, new projects for 
steel mills were kept mushrooming exponentially after the clampdown, which in turn 
was caused by strong demand for steel products. China’s steel production rose from Yu Yongding  342
less than 400 million ton to nearly 700 million ton from 2004 to 2007 (Figure 5). The 
strong demand was based on investment fever and strong external demand, and hence 
was  not  sustainable.  It  is  worth  mentioning  that  over-capacity  is  not  for  a  few 
industries. It is prevalent across all major industries.   































Source: Collective by Dr Zhang Bin.  
Despite the fact that overcapacity in Chinese was serious, until the onset of the 
American  Financial  Crisis,  the  Chinese  economy  showed  no  prevalent  sign  of 
overcapacity.  Rather  it  suffered  from  overheating.  Since  the  middle  of  2007  China’s 
inflation  was  worsening  rapidly.  In  the  February  of  2008,  the  growth  rate  of  CPI 
surpassed 8 percent, the worst since 1996. The overcapacity in China was concealed due 
to two factors. One is the high growth rate of fixed asset investment, and another is the 
even higher growth rate of exports. For example, the excess capacity of steel production 
was  to  be  absorbed  by  the  construction  of  more  steel  plants.  In  the  short-run,  the 
overcapacity was concealed. However, demand neither can be self-sustained nor rely on 
external market for long. The investment rate cannot be raised persistently. Sooner or 
later,  increase  in  investment  demand  will  fail  to  catch  up  with  increase  in  capacity. 
China’s investment rate is more than 40 percent of GDP. It is difficult to envisage how 
the  rate  can  be  further  increased.  When  the  Chinese  economy  was  relatively  small, 
increasing exports could absorb excess capacity effectively. However, as a result of the 
expansion of the Chinese economy, it has become increasingly difficult to rely on exports 
to absorb the excess capacity. Again, the steel industry is a case in point. China has 
already become the world’s number one steel producer. In 2007, 37 percent of global 
steel output was provided by China. It is easy to see that if external demand collapses, 
overheating will turn into over-production, and inflation into deflation immediately.  
II.  THE SUDDEN WORSENING OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION 
IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 2008 
China’s fast growth came to a sudden halt in the third quarter of 2008. In the 
third  quarter,  China’s  GDP  growth  dropped  to  9  percent;  growth  rate  of  industrial 
production fell to 8.2 percent, about half of the rate in the same period of last year; 
Clamp down
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growth rates of many important products fell from double digits to negative; growth 
rate of exports fell from 20 percent in October to –2.2 percent in November; share price 
index fell by 70 percent; growth of real estate investment stagnant and house price 
started to fall in some major cities; and inflation pressure disappeared suddenly. 
Statistics shows that the most important cause for the collapse of China’s growth 
in the 3rd quarter of 2008 was attributable to the sudden collapse of the export market, 
which was in turn caused by the sudden worsening of the US financial crisis since the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers. In all China’s industries, the most dramatic fall in 
production happened in the steel industry. The analysis of the causes of the fall of steel 
production sheds lights on the causes of the fall of the Chinese economy in general in a 
crystal clear way (Table 2).  
Table 2 
Direct Impacts of Fall in Foreign Demand on Steel Production 
Types  Output, Aug.  Output, Sep. 
Reduction in 
Sep.  The fall 
Exports  7.6769milT  6.67mil T  –1mil T  –13.12% 
Total Output  47.8 mil T  45.9 mil T  –1. 9 mil T  –3.93% 
Exports/Total Output  16.06%  14.53%  53.58%  – 
Source: Xue Qiyuan, based on various sources.  
It can be seen that the drop in steel exports accounted for 54  percent of the total 
decrease in steel productions in September 2008. The fall of exports was a direct result of 
the fall of global economy (Figure 6).  

































21-mil tons, May ‘04 
Source:  Seeking  Alpha:  Can  Central  Bankers  Prevent  a  Great  Depression?  http://seekingalpha.com/article/ 
106770, 2008 Nov 19 09:23 AM.  
Besides direct impact, indirect impacts of fall in demand of steel-related exporting 
industries on steel production was also very grate. Just take two industries as example. Yu Yongding  344
 
The  Container  Industry.  Orders  for  containers  have  fallen  dramatically, 
especially in October 2008. Most shipping companies have stopped ordering 
new containers. 
 
The Ship-building Industry. From January to September 2008, global-wide order 
for tonnage of ships has fallen by 27 percent. In September 2008, the order fell by 
66.1 percent. This is a global phenomenon, in October 2008, order for Japanese 
shipping companies fell by 82 percent. That direct and indirect reduction in external 
demand is the single most important cause for the fall in steel production. 
In my view, in summary, the dramatic fall of export demand since the third quarter 
of 2008 is the single most important cause of China’s slowdown. The slowdown in fixed 
asset investment was the second important contributing factor. Contributing factors to the 
fall of fixed asset investment on growth in turn can be attributed to the slowdown in real 
estate investment—as a result of monetary tightening over the past several years, the fall 
of export-related investment, the worsening of expectations, and financial losses made in 
speculations in financial markets by due to the burst of assets bubbles and the collapse of 
commodity prices. The third important cause for the slowdown of the economy is the 
large inventory adjustment. Until the middle of 2008, many Chinese enterprises were still 
expecting  further  rise  in  prices  and  engaged  in  large  scale  hoarding  activities.  The 
unwinding  of  the  inventory  worsened  greatly  the  fall  of  China’s  growth.  Anecdotal 
evidence also shows the wealth effect of the burst asset bubbles also played certain role in 
slowering growth of consumption. 
It is worth mentioning that supply side factors have also played a certain role in the 
slowdown of Chinese economy. Since the middle of 2000s, labour costs have been on 
rising, due to tightening of standards of labour protection and shortage of labour supply 
in  some  areas  and  industries.  The  more  stringent  environmental  standards  also 
contributed to high production cost.   
III. CHINA’S MAIN POLICY RESPONSES TO THE GLOBAL SLOWDOWN 
Since the fourth quarter of 2008, as a result of the dramatic fall of economic 
growth, debate on the policies adopted by the government, especially by the People’s 
Bank  of  China  (PBOC,  China’s  central  bank)  has  gotten  heated.  The  opinions  are 
divided among economists. Some described the policy adopted since 2003, especially 
since 2005 when the Renminbi (China’s currency) depegged from the US dollar and 
embarked on the road of appreciation, as “self-destruction”. In my view, this accusation 
is totally wrong.  Objectives of Chinese government’s policy since 2003 were aimed at 
preventing overheating,  containing asset bubbles,  controlling  inflation,  and reducing 
current account imbalances. Faced with the situation, the government had no choice but 
to implement tight monetary policy. Contrary to the accusation of “self-destruction”, 
the biggest shortcoming of the policy mix during this period was the failure by the 
government to adopt a more forceful demand switching policy, especially to allow the 
Renminbi to appreciate more quickly by reducing central bank’s intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. With benefit of hindsight, a more expansionary fiscal policy 
could  be  used  to  offset  the  possible  negative  impact  of  a  more  forceful  demand 
switching policy (e.g. Renminbi appreciation) on the economy. If the government had China’s Economic Growth  345
succeeded in reducing Chinese economy’s dependence on external demand by using 
exchange rate policy and other policies more forcefully, the Chinese economy would 
have fared much better when the global economy fell drastically. However, it is fair to 
say  that  the  government  and  some  economists  (me  included)  underestimated  the 
dramatic deflationary impact of the global slowdown on the Chinese economy. The 
persistent investment fever since 2002 has created serious excess capacity. However, 
the overcapacity was concealed by strong external demand as well as self-sustained 
investment demand. On the surface, the economy suffered from overheating rather than 
overcapacity. The government should have recognised that, because of the existence of 
overcapacity, the economy could shift from overheating to dramatic slowing down and 
from inflation to deflation in a dramatic fashion, and should be prepared for such a 
dramatic  shift.  In  fact,  such  a  shift  happened,  as  soon  as  the  external  demand 
disappeared as a result of the global economic slowdown. Because it was impossible 
for  the  government  to  have  a  very  clear  idea  about  the  trajectory  of  the American 
Subprime Crisis, I do not know whether there was a better policy combination than that 
was adopted by the government at the time. However, the government could at least 
have prepared the public better for such a shift psychologically. 
When the global slowdown has become apparent, the government shifted its policy 
direction quickly and forcefully. Less than two months after the Lehman Bother fiasco, in 
November 2008, the government started to implement a very large stimulus package. At 
the same time the PBOC also ushered in expansionary monetary policy.     
Expansionary Fiscal Policy  
In November 2008, the government introduced a 4 trillion Yuan ($580 billion) 
stimulus package for 2009 and 2010. To have a better idea about the scale of the 
package, it is worth mentioning the following statistics. In 2008, China’s GDP was 
29 trillion Yuan. The originally, the government expenditures in 2008 was budgeted 
about  5.7  trillion  Yuan,  which  means  that  China’s  government  expenditures/GDP 
ratio would be 19.6 percent. The package accounted for 14 percent of GDP in 2008. 
Besides  the  increase  in  government  expenditures,  the  government  also  considered 
possible tax reductions, which included VAT reform, Business tax cut and raising the 
threshold of individual income taxes. Among the 4 trillion package, the new added 
expenditures  are about 1  trillion. According  to  National Development and  Reform 
Commission (NDRC), assuming that the fiscal multiplier in China is 2-3, the package 
can create about one percentage point increase in GDP in each year for 2009 and 
2010.  On  top  of  the  central  government’s  stimulus  package,  each  province  was 
encouraged to raise money to launch its own complimentary stimulus package. Soon 
after  the  announcement  of  the  stimulus  package  by  the  central  government,  local 
provincial  governments  announced  their  own  complimentary  packages.  The  total 
amount of planned stimulus packages announced by local governments totaled at 18 
trillion Yuan. 
The structure of the 4 trillion stimulus package is summarised by the following 
table (Table 3 and Figure 7). Yu Yongding  346
Table 3 
The Breakdown of 4 Trillion Yuan Stimulus Package (Unit billion Yuan)
4 
Construction of houses for low income urban households  280 
Increased spending on rural infrastructure and boosting rural incomes  370 
Expenditures in transportation network construction  1800 
Increased investment on medical service, culture and education  40 
Increased spending on ecology protection  350 
Technical innovation and economic restructuring  160 
Sichuan post-earthquake reconstruction  1000 
Total  4000 
Source: NDRC.  












tech innovation and economic
restructuring
post earthquake reconstruction
medical services, culture, and education  
It is easy to see that most of the money will be spent on building railway, highway 
and  so  on,  followed  by  earthquake  rebuilding.  Sources  of  financing  of  the  stimulus 
package were designed as follows: 
 
Central government financing one-quarter of the 4 trillion Yuan package, in forms of 
direct grants and interest rate subsidies. In the case of central government-sponsored 
project, NDRC-MoF may inject all of the registered capital.   
4In  March  2009,  the  package  has  undergone  some  adjustments.  As  a  result,  the  expenditures  on 
construction  of  houses  for  low  income  urban  households  increased  to  400  billion  Yuan,  expenditures  in 
transportation network construction reduced to 1500 billion Yuan; investment on medical service, culture and 
education increased 150 billion Yuan; spending on ecology protection reduced to 210 billion Yuan; expenditures 
on technical innovation and economic restructuring increased to 370 billion Yuan. China’s Economic Growth  347
 
Government bonds will be issue to cover the budget deficit. 
 
Central government will issued bonds on behalf of local governments to fill the 
short fall in financing local projects. 
 
Banks loans will be important sources of funds, especially for local governments. 
In March of 2009, People’s Congress approved the government’s new budget for 
2009. According to this budget, in 2009, the total government (central plus local) revenue 
would be 6.623 trillion Yuan, up 8.0 percent from 2008, among which, revenue of the 
central government should reach 3.586 trillion Yuan, an increase of 9.8 percent over 2008 
(Table 4). Total government expenditure (central plus local) would be 7.635 trillion Yuan, 
up 22.1 percent, among which, expenditure of the central government would be 4.3865 
trillion Yuan, an increase of 848.501 billion Yuan, up 24 percent (Table 5). In 2009, the 
total government deficit would be 950 billion Yuan ($139 billion), the highest in six 
decades, compared with 111 billion Yuan in 2008. Central government’s deficit will be at 
750 billion Yuan, 570 billion Yuan more than last year. The state council will allow local 
governments to issue 200 billion Yuan worth of government bonds through the ministry 
of  finance.  The  expected  budget  deficit/GDP  ratio  will  be  about  3  percent  of  GDP, 
compared with the budget deficit/GDP ratio of 0.4 percent in 2008.   
Table 4 
Revenue Targets for 2009 (Central Government Revenue only) 
Item  Amount (Billion Yuan)  Change (%) 
Domestic VAT  14563  7.9 
Domestic Sales Taxes  443.4  72.7 
Import Tariffs and other Taxes Related to Imports  989.5  8 
Corporate Income Taxes  760.5  6 
Individual Income Taxes  239  7 
Stamp Tax  24.5  –74.2 
Vehicle Purchase Tax  97  –2 
Export Tax Rebates  670.8 (reducing revenue)  14.4 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2009.  
Table 5 
Expenditure Targets for 2009 (Central Government Spending only) 
Item  Amount (billion Yuan)  Change (%) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Water Conservancy  344.6  27.5 
Education   198.1  23.9 
Medical and Health Care  118.1  38.2 
Social Security   335.1  22.1 
Low-Income Housing   49.3  171 
Cultural Programmes   28.0  10.7 
Grain, Cooking Oil and Materials Reserves  178.0  61.1 
Science and Technology   146.1  25.6 
Environmental Protection  123.7  18.9 
Public Security  116.1  32.6 
Earthquake Reconstruction  108  
National Defense   472.9  15.3 
Transport  188.7  17.9 
General Public Services  131.4  8 
Interest Payments on Bonds  137.2  7.3 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2009. Yu Yongding  348
There  is  no  detailed  information  available  on  how  the  budget  for  2009  was 
amalgamated with the 4 trillion Yuan stimulus package. However, attention should be 
paid to some key figures provided by the Ministry of Finance in a related report on 
central government’s 2009 budget:  
 
908  billion  Yuan  in  public  spending,  an  increase  of  487.5  billion  Yuan,  an 
increase of 54 percent over 2008.  
 
123.08 billion Yuan for direct subsidies to agricultural production and trade, an 
increase of 19.4 percent over 2008.  
 
220.833  billion  Yuan  for  subsistence  allowances  for  both  urban  and  rural 
families.  
 
103.341  billion  Yuan  for  subsidising  rural  residents'  purchase  of  home 
appliances and vehicles and increase reserves of important materials such as 
grain, petroleum, nonferrous metals and specialty steel products. 
 
716.14 billion Yuan, an increase of 120.59 billion Yuan or 20.2 percent, to assist 
agriculture, rural areas and farmers. 
 
728.463 billion Yuan for items directly related to the people's well-being such as 
education, medical and health care, the social safety net, and so on, an increase 
of 29.4 percent over 2008 
 




500 billion Yuan reductions in Taxes and fees, which partially will be the result 
of VAT restructuring, increase in tax rebate, and exemptions.  On the whole the 
government plans to withdraw or suspend 100 administrative charges by 2009. 
As of May 31 2009, China allocated 562 billion Yuan (82.3 billion U.S. dollars) 
for public works projects, completing 61.9 percent of its central budget for 2009. 
More than half of the allocated went toward rural development and prominent 
infrastructure construction, according to the MOF. A total of 138.1 billion Yuan was put 
into  projects  to  enhance  rural  infrastructure  and  improve  living  standard  in  the 
countryside through the construction of irrigation facilities, power grids and paved roads.  
Another 163.5 billion Yuan went toward infrastructure projects such as railway, 
highway, airports and harbour construction.  
Other spending included 84.8 billion Yuan for reconstruction in areas hit by the 
May 12 earthquake last year, 42.7 billion Yuan for low-income housing project, 44.2 
billion Yuan for education, medical care and cultural development, 41.2 billion Yuan for 
industrial upgrades, 27.8 billion Yuan for environmental protection and energy saving as 
well as 19.7 billion Yuan for public service facility buildings.
6 
It can be seen that the single most important element in China’s stimulus plan is public 
work. This policy can work but it is also an antithesis to the structure readjustment. China’s 
investment rate was already too high in all measurements. The extremely high investment 
growth rate, which hit an annual growth rate of 32.9 percent y/y in the first five months of 
2009, will inevitable lead to the even higher investment rate, which on average already  
5Source: Xinhua News Agency: Key figures from Chinese Finance Ministry's 2009 draft budget report, 
March 05, 2009. 
6Xinhua News Agency, 2009-06-04 20:52:35. China’s Economic Growth  349
surpassing 43 percent over the past several years. The excessively high investment rate in turn 
will lead either to more serious overcapacity or lower efficiency reflected in an even higher 
capital-output ratio, which was already very high in China. Another important feature of 
China’s stimulus plan is the large amount of tax rebate. The amount of rebates was planned to 
be 670 billion Yuan, account for some 15 percent of the total central government expenditure. 
This policy is very problematic. As a result of the policy, some exporting enterprises can 
survive or linger on for a while. But the negative impact of the policy on resource allocation 
and rationalisation of the economic structure is equally obvious.  
Another important issue is the sustainability of China’s expansionary fiscal policy. It 
should be emphasised that China has a very comfortable fiscal position. Over the past decade, 
China’s budget deficit over GDP ratio was very low. In 2007, China ran a budget surplus. As 
a result, China’s debt balance over GDP ratio is just 18 percent. Even after having adopted the 
expansionary fiscal policy, by the end of 2009, China’s debt balance over GDP ratio will still 
be lower than 20 percent. Therefore, there is plentiful policy room for the government to 
manoeuvre. However, complacency is dangerous. As a result of the stimulus package, the 
policy space can be used up quickly. One of the most worrying phenomenons is that wasteful 
investment has become ubiquitous now, which in turn will produce increasingly high pressure 
on the government budget. Nonperforming loan ratio definitely will be increasing in the 
future. The quality of the growth and sustainability of the growth can be compromised by the 
over-zealot investment drive (Table 6).  
Table 6 
Expansionary Monetary Policy 
Billion Yuan, %  May  April  March  February  January 
Growth of MI  18.7  17.5  17.0  10.9  6.7 
Growth of M2  25.7  26.0  25.5  20.5  18.8 
Credit  664.5  591.8  1890  1070  1620 
Growth of Credits  30.6  29.7  29.8  24.2  21.3 
Source: People’s Bank of China.  
Up to May the increase in bank credits was 5.77 trillion Yuan, higher than the 
official target of 5 trillion Yuan for the entire year. In contrast, the annual increases in 
bank  credits  in  2006  and  2007  were  3.18  and  3.63  trillion  Yuan,  respectively.  The 
increase in bank credits in the first quarter was surprisingly high, and the same was true 
of the growth rate of broad money M2. The gap between the growth rate of M2 and 
nominal GDP has broken the record in history.  
The most important cause of the rapid increase in credits and money supply is 
attributable to PBOC’s expansionary monetary policy. Previously, corresponding to the 
rapid increase in liquidity caused by PBOC intervention in the exchange market, which 
was aimed at offsetting the appreciation pressure on the RMB created by persistent trade 
surplus (and capital account surplus), the PBOC sold large amount central bank bills to 
mop up the excess liquidity. Since the fourth quarter of 2008, the PBOC has reduced the 
strength of sterilisation operation. As a result, the liquidity has inundated the inter-bank 
money market and even once made the interest rates in the inter-bank market lower than 
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condition is very different from those in America and Europe in the global financial 
crisis.  China’s financial system is not suffering from credit crunch. Its banking system is 
safe and sound in terms of bad loans, capital adequacy and so on. China’s assets bubbles 
are not that serious or have been corrected. As a result, China’s monetary multiplier has 
not  fallen  dramatically  as  in  the  United  States.  Therefore,  the  dramatic  increase  in 
liquidity in the inter-bank money market translates to rapid increase in bank credits and 
broad money. On top of less sterilisation, other measurements aimed at accommodating 
expansionary fiscal policy have also been introduced. These measurements include: 
 
Abolishment of credit rationing. 
 
Lowering reserve requirement. 
 
Lowering interest rates on banks’ loans and deposits. 
 
Lowering the thresholds of down payments of mortgages. 
In my view, China’s monetary policy in the first quarter of 2009 was too loose. 
The rapid expansion of credits and money supply were, to a certain extent, the result of 
non-market interferences. These are not sound economic rationales, which can be used to 
support  such  a  dramatic  expansion.  If  commercial  banks  had  been  allowed  to  make 
decisions  that  were  based  purely  on  economic  consideration,  growth  of  credits  and 
money supply would not have grown so fast. And there would have been fewer needs to 
worry the consequences on possibilities of rising nonperforming loan ratio, worsening of 
economic structure and resurging of assets bubbles. The huge gap between the growth 
rate of M2 and nominal GDP implies very large inflation pressure in the future. Taking 
into consideration the fact that China has highest M2/GDP ratio in the world, the possible 
grave consequences of a loose monetary policy is even more frightening.  
IV.  SHORT TERM AND MEDIUM TERM PROSPECTS OF  
THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
I have not a shred of doubt about China’s ability to achieve a growth rate of 8 
percent in 2009. The confidence is based on the following facts: 
 
Strong fiscal position. 
 
Vast domestic market. 
 
Strong external position. 
As a result, the scope for using stimulating package by the government is very 
great. China will be able to spend its way out economic slowdown. In fact, now in the 
Chinese economy “green shoots” can be seen everywhere. It is possible that the Chinese 
economy has bottomed out since the end of fourth quarter of 2008. 
According the most recent government announcement, industrial production rose 
8.9 percent in May from a year earlier, higher than April’s 7.3 percent growth. Retail 
sales increased 15.2 percent after a 14.8 percent rise the previous month. The growth rate 
of fixed asset investment was 32 percent. The PMI index has been kept above 50 three 
months in a row. Housing prices have started to rise in many important cities and The 
Shanghai Composite index are approaching 2,700 from the low of 1,600 in late 2008. The 
bad news is that exports in May fell 26.4 percent from a year earlier, China’s Customs 
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despite trade promotion policies such as the increase in tax rebate, the recovery of exports 
is something which cannot be decided by exporting countries along. 
Despite  the  strong  showing  of  recovery,  worries  about  sustainability  in  the 
recovery are still lingering. The Chinese government is facing with the duel tasks of crisis 
management and structural adjustment. While we can say that the crisis management has 
been successful, the same is difficult to say about structural adjustment. To achieve a 
sustainable growth and improve the welfare of the nation, growth should not be achieved 
at the expense of structural adjustment. China’s structural problems include: 
 
High external dependency. 
 






Income distribution gap between different social group and between rural and 
urban areas. 
 
Insufficiency  in  the provision  of  social  goods  (social  safety  net,  medic-care, 
education, etc.). 
If China fails to tackle these structural problems, growth is likely to have a W 
shape trajectory. In order to deal with structural problems, China should push further for 
more reforms. Actually, the current crisis also means good opportunity for the speeding 
up of reforms. 
Some key areas of reforms include: 
 
Liberalise  the  restriction  to  the  entry  into  Medic-care,  sanitation,  education, 
finance, communication and transportation. Rules of fair competition should be 
applied to these areas. Anti-monopoly laws should be formulated and enforced 
in natural monopoly industries;  
 
Liberalise  price  controls  over  energy,  water,  electricity  and  allow  market 
demand and supply to determine the prices of these products; 
 
Further liberalise control on interest rates and establish a more flexible exchange 
rate regime, and capital controls can be further liberalised side by side with 
internationalisation of the Renminbi (China’s currency); and 
 
Low  efficient  enterprises  should  be  allowed  to  go  bankrupt,  while  the 
government should take more responsibilities for providing safety net for the 
employees of the enterprises.  
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Over  past  three  decades, owning  to  the gradual reform and  opening  up  to  the 
outside, the Chinese economy has maintained an average annual growth rate of GDP as 
high as 9.8 percent. Now China has become the third largest economy, the second largest 
trading nation and the largest foreign exchange reserve holding country in the world. 
China’s growth is truly a epoch making miracle. 
Now  as  the  global  financial  and  economic  crisis  is  still  unfolding,  the  growth 
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the Chinese government has been very successful in responding to the global slowdown 
in  a  very  swift  and  determined  fashion. As  a  result,  the  Chinese  economy  has  been 
bottoming out. However, the seriousness of the impact of the global crisis on the Chinese 
economy shows that China needs to speed up its structural reform and adjust its once 
very  successful  strategy  and  policies  in  managing  the  growth  and  maintaining  the 
stability of the growth in a timely way. Otherwise, the Chinese economy may lose its 
growth momentum in the near future.  
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Comments  
Professor  Yu’s  excellent  presentation  provides  much  food  for  thought.  China 
achieved spectacular economic growth in the last two and a half decades that transformed 
China’s economy making it the second largest in the world and China a middle income 
country. Between 2002 and 2007, China witnessed unprecedented growth. It grew at an 
average annual rate of 10.5 percent in contrast to the average annual rate of 9.7 percent 
since the last two and a half decades. Professor Yu identifies two main engines of China’s 
spectacular  growth  between  2002  and  2007  namely  (i)  export  growth—at  an  annual 
average  of  29  percent  over  the  five  year  period  and  (ii)  growth  of  fixed  assets 
investment—at an annual average of 24 percent over the same period.  
As a result of the onset of the global financial crisis, during the third quarter of 
2008, there was a sudden slowdown in China’s growth, which dropped to 9 percent. The 
main causes of the fall in growth of the Chinese economy, as identified by Professor Yu, 
were  a  dramatic  fall  in  export  demand,  slowdown  in  fixed  asset  investment,  and 
inventory adjustment. 
According to Professor Yu, the main objectives of China’s macroeconomic policy 
since 2003 have been to contain overheating, asset bubbles, inflation as well as to reduce 
international imbalances. However the biggest shortcoming of Chinese macroeconomic 
policy has been failure to adopt a more forceful demand switching policy by effectively 
using fiscal policy to offset the tightening effect of monetary policy as well as its failure 
to use exchange rate policy to reduce dependence on external demand.  
China’s  growth  of  the  last  decade  or  so  not  only  transformed  the  Chinese 
economy, but it also impacted the world economy in a number of ways. Perhaps the most 
significant impact was the large expansion in world supply of industrial goods, which 
seems  to  have  fooled  the  worlds  central  bankers,  policy-makers  and  economists  into 
thinking that the world had changed, i.e., you could have high growth with low inflation 
despite huge expansions in world liquidity. The consequent inaction on their part resulted 
in the build up of a major asset price bubble, particularly in housing, which in many ways 
is at the root of the global financial crises.   
The Global Financial Crisis is likely to have a two-fold impact. Firstly, the crises 
will impact the world economy in terms of a worldwide recession, possibly the worst 
since the great depression. According to IMF’s latest projection (March 2009), world 
output will decline by between 0.5 and 1.5 percent in 2009, with only a very gradual 
recovery beginning in 2010. Likewise, the International Labour Office (ILO) says in its 
annual Global Employment Trends report that the global economic crisis is expected to 
lead to a dramatic increase in the number of people joining the ranks of the unemployed, 
working  poor  and  those  in  vulnerable  employment.  Similarly  the  worldwide  crisis  is 
likely to set back progress on poverty reduction and social development.  
Secondly, the global financial crisis is likely to impact economic thinking. With 
blind faith in markets shaken, there is a rehabilitation of Keynesian economics, with its 
greater  reliance  on  public  spending  and  stress  on  the  need  for  better  regulation 
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real sectors will be questioned. Finally, the currently dominant paradigm in development 
economics will be subject to greater criticism. This paradigm largely stresses on getting 
prices right, privatisation, export oriented growth, and minimal role of the government – 
limited largely to maintaining macroeconomic stability. The success of East Asia and 
China is seen as proof of the superiority of this paradigm—though China and many East 
Asian  countries  followed  their  own  version  of  this  strategy.  While  this  paradigm, 
particularly the Washington Consensus, was already under attack, a new dimension will 
be added to the critique in the aftermath of the global financial crises, i.e., are these 
policies appropriate for the post-crises world? And if not, how should they be modified? 
These are interesting questions, but I will restrict my comments to the impact of the 
Crisis on China and its plans to deal with it. 
Trade has played a key role in China’s outstanding growth performance—in fact 
by the time of the crisis it was evident that China had become too dependent on external 
demand. China’s economic managers were aware of this, but according to Professor Yu 
the export industry had become so influential that it was able to prevent the government 
from adopting a forceful demand switching policy during the last five years when it had 
the opportunity. Therefore, the recession in developed countries and slowdown in world 
trade could have a massive impact on China’s exports and thus growth in the economy.  
China’s main policy response to the global slowdown has been an expansionary 
fiscal policy. A four trillion Yuan ($580 billion) stimulus package will be implemented 
over  two  years—out  of  which  approximately  forty  five  percent  will  be  spent  on 
infrastructure investment while twenty five percent on earthquake rehabilitation. In 2008, 
this package accounted for fourteen percent of GDP which stood at approximately twenty 
nine  trillion  Yuan.  Expansionary  fiscal  policy  also  calls  for  tax  reduction.  More 
specifically  it  entails  a  VAT reform,  a  cut  in  business  tax  as  well  as  an  increase  in 
threshold  of  individual  income  tax.  The  government  also  plans  to  undertake  new 
expenditure worth one trillion Yuan in the economy. With the Chinese multiplier ranging 
between two and three, NDRC forecasts that this package can potentially create a one 
percentage point increase in GDP growth rate each for 2009 and 2010. To complement 
the  expansionary  fiscal  stance,  China  is  also  following  an  accommodating  monetary 
policy  by  abolishing  credit  rationing,  lowering  reserve  requirement,  interest  rates  on 
banks’  loans and deposits,  thresholds of down  payments of  mortgages as well as by 
exercising less sterilisation.   
New budget for 2009 entails a budget deficit of 950 billion Yuan. Debt/GDP ratio 
is expected to be twenty percent while deficit to GDP ratio is expected to be about three 
percent.  The  budget  involves  fiscal  expenditures  on  Science  and  Technology  (146 
billion), social security (293 billion), and rural development (716 billion). It also entails 
tax and fee reductions worth 500 billion Yuan. For 2009, the main objectives are to 
achieve a growth rate of eight percent and an inflation rate of four percent. According to 
Professor  Yu,  given  China’s  strong  fiscal  position,  vast  domestic  market,  and  strong 
external  position,  a  growth  rate  of  8  percent  seems  achievable.  In  fact  since  mid-
December the economy has begun to rebound.  
China can afford to follow such a policy because of its large foreign exchange 
reserves and significant fiscal space, but I think that this will only work in the short run 
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capacity  will  be  prevalent  in  consumer  based  export  industries  while  demand  that  is 
likely  to  be  generated  by  a  public  spending  based  stimulus  will  be  in  investment 
industries.  While  the  impact  on  investment  has  already  taken  effect,  so  far  Chinese 
macroeconomic policy has not been successful in stimulating consumption. Moreover 
due to China’s extremely high export dependency (in 2006 exports/GDP ratio was 40 
percent)  following  an  export  driven  growth  agenda  is  no  longer  possible.  China 
ultimately needs to generate domestic demand for its consumer industries which will 
require a reduction in high savings rate. However, high saving rates in China are tied to 
inadequate provision of existing public health system, pensions/old age support system, 
etc.  Therefore  unless  these  structural  problems  are  addressed,  it  will  be  difficult  to 
increase private consumption. 
Professor Yu is fully aware of these difficulties. He argues that investment-driven 
and  export  driven  growth  is  not  sustainable.  Self  sustained  growth  of  Fixed  Asset 
Investment requires construction of more steel plants to absorb excess capacity of steel 
production. However demand cannot be sustained by an ever-increase in investment rate. 
Likewise external demand dependency is subject to uncertainty. When external demand 
collapses,  overheating  turns  into  over  production,  and  inflation  turns  into  deflation 
immediately.  He  also  stresses  that  the  most  serious  challenge  is  to  strike  a  balance 
between growth and structural adjustment so that growth is not achieved at the expense of 
structural adjustment. Some of the structural problems highlighted include high external 
dependency,  high  investment  rate,  pollution,  energy  efficiency,  income  distribution 
across regions as well as across groups and inadequate provision of social safety nets.  
He  suggests  speeding  up  reforms  as  the  way  out.  Some  key  areas  of  reform 
identified by Professor Yu are: (i) improving access to Medicare, sanitation, education, 
finance, communication and transportation; (ii) implementing fair competition rules and 
liberalising price controls over energy, water, electricity and allowing market demand 
and supply to determine the prices of these products; (iii) adopting a flexible exchange 
rate regime and further liberalising interest rate controls; and (iv) allowing low efficient 
enterprises to go bankrupt. 
In the end I would like to note that while China, because of its massive foreign 
exchange  reserves  and  significant  fiscal  space,  may  be  able  to  rely  on  public 
investment/spending  as  a  means  of  stimulating  growth,  developing  countries  like 
Pakistan will not be able to do so. Pakistan, for example, will instead need to concentrate 
on promoting private investment, exports, and labour intensive sectors like agriculture, 
SMEs,  and  housing,  as  well  as  aim  to  achieve  greater  efficiency  in  public  resource 
allocation. This is clearly a much more difficult task. 
In conclusion I would like to congratulate Prof. Yu on his excellent paper, which 
helps us to understand the issues facing China at these critical times. Given the size and 
importance of China’s economy it is some comfort to know that China will continue to 
grow at a reasonable pace and this will help to mitigate the impact of the global crisis on the 
world economy and hopefully make the recession shorter and less damaging. Thank you.  
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